Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzscheforschung Jahrgang: 23 Heft: 1 Seiten: 133-138.

De Dreu and Gross's distinction between attack and defense is complicated in real-world conflicts because competing leaders construe their position as one of defense, and power imbalances place status quo challengers in a defensive position. Their account of defense as vigilant avoidance is incomplete because it avoids a reference to anger which transforms anxious avoidance into collective and unified action.

"Hannah Arendt war der schwierigste Film, den ich je gemacht habe", sagt Margarethe von Trotta. Die grosse Denkerin Hannah Arendt fühlte sich.

Vorbemerkung: Das Staunen -- Die Scholastik -- Héloïse (um 1099-1164): Die Logik der Liebe -- Mystik als Schau göttlicher Weisheit -- Hildegard von Bingen (1998-1179): "Scivias--Wisse die Wege" -- Die "Querelle du Roman de la Rose" -- Christine de Pizan (um 1364-um 1430): "die Stadt der Frauen" -- Die Aufklärung -- Émilie du Châtlet (1706-1749): "Rede vom Glück" -- Romantik und Neuromantik -- Ricarda Huch (1864-1947): Der Mensch der Zukunft aus dem Geiste der Romantik -- Die Phänomenologie -- Edith Stein (...) (1891-1942): Philosophin der Phänomenologie, Märtyrerin, Heilige -- Philosophie der Pflichten dem Menschen gegenüber -- Simone Weil (1909-1943): Sozialistische Aktivistin, Philosophin, Mystikerin -- Philosophie des Politischen -- Hannah Arendt (1906-1975): Philosophisches Engagement im Zeitalter des Totalitarismus -- Der Existenzialismus -- Simone de Beauvoir (1908-1986): Freiheit und Emanzipation -- Philosophie der Verantwortung in einer globalisierten Welt -- Jeanne Hersch (1910-2000): Freiheit und Verantwortung. (shrink)

The present volume brings Arendt's notes for these lectures together with other of her texts on the topic of judging and provides important clues to the likely direction of Arendt's thinking in this area.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Listening to the World:Prophetic Anger and Sapiential CompassionFelix WilfredPope Benedict XVI has insisted all along how the absence of reference to God has caused dehumanization in our world. Unfortunately, what does not seem to occur to him and those who think along these lines is how the absence of concern and engagement with the issue of suffering—poverty, oppression, racism, and sexism—causes dehumanization. Suffering epitomizes the condition of our contemporary (...) world. This is the meeting point of any meaningful common discourse of religious traditions, independent of the God question. For those believing in God, the very God question is itself bound up with the question of suffering. As Gustavo Gutierrez has rightly pointed out, the real question today is how to speak about God in a world of suffering, and indeed suffering of the innocent.1a world not angry enoughWhat defines us as individuals and groups is the way we respond to suffering. This is a crucial question. For, as Hannah Arendt has drawn to our attention, there is something like a banality of evil.2 Its everyday genesis and manifestations are not anything sensational, as they are mostly committed by ordinary men and women who go about their daily lives and are by no means moral monsters.The first sentiment in responding to suffering should be a sense of horror, trembling, and indignation at the injustice inflicted on the victims, and that is very important. We note that the environment we live in is so politicized that human beings are less and less shocked by the horror of evil. Suffering has become a matter of statistics, codification, media commercialization, and photography.3What strikes us is the fact that anger characterized men and women of great leadership, because they were upset with the existing situation and they imagined a different order of things. Moses was such a man in the biblical tradition. In modern times, such was the case for example with B. R. Ambedkar, the foremost leader of the Dalits (“Untouchables”) of India, and Martin Luther King Jr. of the civil rights movement in the United States, both of whom were great, angry leaders. We could [End Page 63] characterize this as “holy anger.” It aims not at destroying the enemies or punishing them but at redeeming a society from the consequences of suffering.prophetic anger: some salient featuresWhen we speak of prophetic anger, the question that could be raised is: Whose anger? It is first and foremost the anger of the victims. For it is they who know the pain evil inflicts in the form of grinding poverty, violence, and humiliation. Along with the victims, we have those in solidarity with them who express rage at the situations of gross injustice. Anger is of different kinds. Anger can and does often accompany the spirit of vindication and revenge.4 This anger is aimed at others as enemies, and as threats to oneself. But prophetic anger has a direct reference to justice. The anger of the victims has something visceral about it. The whole being of the victim reacts to the injustice and oppression suffered—be it women; discriminated-against ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities; or any victim of human rights violations. There is then ample room to speak about “black rage,” “Dalit rage,” and “gender rage,” which express the anguish of the victims pushed to the wall through long-standing oppression and yet having the strength to imagine something different. Prophetic anger is a healing anger. It opens the wounds of society and has ultimately the goal of healing them.Prophetic anger is the result of being gripped by an encounter and experience of something wonderful and exceedingly beautiful beyond the present distortion of reality. This is something different from a mere human passion. Like symbols that help us convey what words and speech are incapable of, so anger is a medium to bridge the gulf that divides the lofty realities and the misery of the prevailing situation. The encounter and experience that is in the prophets also finds expression in prophetic anger as it is directed at the cause behind the suffering of the innocent.Prophetic anger is directed... (shrink)

A book review of 'Feeling Extended: Sociality as Extended Body-Becoming-Mind' by Douglas Robinson. Publisher: MIT Press, 2013.

Theories concerning love in the West tend to be bound by the problematic constraints of patriarchal conceptions of what counts ontologically as “true” or “universal” love. It seems that feminist love studies must choose between shining light on these constraints or bursting through them. In this article I give a feminist analysis of Augustine of Hippo's theory of love through a philosophical, psychological, and theological reading of his complicated relationships with women. I argue that, given the “embodied” nature of his (...) many loves throughout his life, there is room in Augustine's account of love for a gendered reading of love that is unconstrained by patriarchal notions concerning which gender is capable of which kind of love. Augustine's theory of love is one that is not coldly universal but bodied and personal; indeed, although it is founded inside patriarchal historical constructions, it is capable of bursting out of these constraints and suggesting an egalitarian, nongendered view of love. (shrink)

In his biography on Augustine, Possidius writes: “His table was frugal and sparing, though indeed with the herbs and lentils he also had meats at times for the sake of his guests or for some of the weaker brethren”.1 Given the importance of friendship in Augustine’s life, it is not surprising that he ate meat for the sake of others and not for his own pleasures. However, Augustine spends much time in Book X of his Confessions obsessing over his delight (...) in everyday activities, including eating2. Indeed, Augustine examines the relationship between desire and the object of desire throughout the Confessions, his ultimate focus being on the nature of our concupiscent hearts. In this paper, I will explore Augustine’s seemingly unhealthy relationship with food by discussing the place of food in his eschatology, his account of concupiscence and will, and his theory of interiority as given in the Confessions. Ultimately, for Augustine, there is a beauty to eating that is found in its relationship to the sensual experience of God. (shrink)

'History' in the modern sense of the word refers to both the way in which human beings develop in time and the way in which this is interpreted. Thus 'Critique of History' concerns a way of life as well as a mode of reflection.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

A l'occasion des cent ans de sa naissance, 27 personnalités évoquent leurs amitiés singulières et uniques avec le philosophe.

Die Studien und Texte zur Sozialgeschichte der Literatur (STSL)veröffentlichen seit 1975 herausragende literatur-, geschichts- und kulturwissenschaftliche Arbeiten zur vornehmlich deutschen Literatur vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart. Schwerpunkt der literaturgeschichtlichen und theoretischen Abhandlungen sowie der Quellen- und Materialienbände ist das Verhältnis von literarischem Text und gesellschaftlich-historischem Kontext. Als maßgebliche Publikationsreihe einer seit den 1960er Jahren einflussreichen Sozialgeschichte der Literatur prägt STSL zugleich die literaturwissenschaftliche Diskussion über mögliche Austauschbeziehungen zwischen Literatur-, Geschichts- und Sozialwissenschaften.

In a 2020 article in Analysis, Lippert-Rasmussen argues that the moral equality account of the hypocrite’s lack of standing to blame fails. To object to this account, Lippert-Rasmussen considers the contrary of hypocrisy: hypercrisy. In this article, I show that if hypercrisy is a problem for the moral equality account, it is also a problem for Lippert-Rasmussen’s own account of why hypocrites lack standing to blame. I then reflect on the hypocrite’s and hypercrite’s standing to self-blame, which reveals that the (...) challenge hypercrisy poses for accounts of standing is different from the challenge Lippert-Rasmussen articulates. (shrink)

Trust is one of the big buzzwords in debates about the shaping of society, democracy, and emerging technologies. For example, one prominent idea put forward by the High‐Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence appointed by the European Commission is that artificial intelligence should be trustworthy. In this essay, we explore the notion of trust and argue that both proponents and critics of trustworthy AI have flawed pictures of the nature of trust. We develop an approach to understanding trust in AI (...) that does not conceive of trust merely as an accelerator for societal acceptance of AI technologies. Instead, we argue, trust is granted through leaps of faith. For this reason, trust remains precarious, fragile, and resistant to promotion through formulaic approaches. We also highlight the significance of distrust in societal deliberation, as it is relevant to trust in various and intricate ways. Among the fruitful aspects of distrust is that it enables individuals to forgo technology if desired, to constrain its power, and to exercise meaningful human control. (shrink)

Traditionally, theories of moral responsibility feature only the minimally sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. While these theories are well-suited to account for the threshold of responsibility, it’s less clear how they can address questions about the degree to which agents are responsible. One feature that intuitively affects the degree to which agents are morally responsible is how difficult performing a given action is for them. Recently, philosophers have begun to develop accounts of scalar moral responsibility that make use of this (...) notion of difficulty (Coates and Swenson 2013; Nelkin 2016). In this paper, I argue that these accounts, although innovative, are incomplete. The degree to which agents are morally responsible is determined not only by the difficulties that agents face but also by the quality of the reasons for which they act. (shrink)

In a recent essay, Deery and Nahmias :1255–1276, 2017) utilize interventionism about causation to develop an account of causal sourcehood in order to defend compatibilism about free will and moral responsibility from manipulation arguments. In this paper, we criticize Deery and Nahmias’s analysis of sourcehood by drawing a distinction between two forms of causal invariance that can come into conflict on their account. We conclude that any attempt to resolve this conflict will either result in counterintuitive attributions of moral responsibility (...) or will undermine their response to manipulation arguments. (shrink)

Karl Marx, as distinguished from the true and not the imagined sources of the Nazi ideology of racism, clearly belongs to the tradition of Western political thought. As an ideology Marxism is doubtless the only link that binds the totalitarian form of government directly to that tradition; apart from it any attempt to deduce totalitarianism directly from a strand of occidental thought would lack even the semblance of plausibility.

Scientists imagine constantly. They do this when generating research problems, designing experiments, interpreting data, troubleshooting, drafting papers and presentations, and giving feedback. But when and how do scientists learn how to use imagination? Across 6 years of ethnographic research, it has been found that advanced career scientists feel comfortable using and discussing imagination, while graduate and undergraduate students of science often do not. In addition, members of marginalized and vulnerable groups tend to express negative views about the strength of their (...) imaginations and the general usefulness of imagination in science. After introducing these findings and discussing the typical relationship between a scientist and their imagination across a career, we argue that reducing the number or power of active imaginations in science is epistemically counterproductive. We suggest several ways to bring imagination back into science in a more inclusive way, especially through courses on imagination for scientists, good role models, and exemplar-based learning. (shrink)

Foucault nous a donne de multiples potentialites pour repenser certaines des questions classiques posees par l histoire et les sciences des religions. Cet ouvrage fait etat des nombreux excursus du philosophe vers les domaines de la spiritualite antique, de l histoire du christianisme primitif, de l ascetisme chretien, ou encore de la question des marginalites religieuses. Il est l occasion, surtout, de reflechir sur quelques uns des - outils - mis en place par le philosophe et de montrer comment ceux-ci (...) peuvent se reveler pertinents pour saisir les phenomenes religieux de notre modernite. Des phenomenes qui se comprennent a l interieur de problemes historiques, politiques et sociaux, culturels. Seule maniere, repete Foucault, de nous proteger contre les syntheses toutes faites et les decoupages familiers, mais aussi d ouvrir la reflexion a l epreuve de la realite et de l actualite. Jean-Francois Bert est Maitre d enseignement et de recherche a l Universite de Lausanne. Specialiste de l histoire des sciences humaines, il developpe une nouvelle approche qui se veut attentive aux pratiques et aux techniques savantes. Il a codirige le Cahier de l Herne sur Foucault (2011), et a participe a l edition, en Pleiade, des oeuvres du philosophe.". (shrink)

Much has been written about the fittingness, epistemic, and standing norms that govern blame. In this paper, we argue that there exists a norm of blame that has yet to receive philosophical discussion and without which an account of the ethics of blame will be incomplete: a norm proscribing comparatively arbitrary blame. By reflecting on the objectionableness of comparatively arbitrary blame, we stand to elucidate a substantive, and thus far overlooked, norm governing our attributions of responsibility. Accordingly, our aim in (...) this paper is to develop a comparative non-arbitrariness condition on blame that can enrich our understanding of the ethics of blame. (shrink)

Recent work on blameworthiness has prominently featured discussions of guilt. The philosophers who develop guilt-based views of blameworthiness do an excellent job of attending to the evaluative and affective features of feeling guilty. However, these philosophers have been less attentive to guilt’s characteristic action tendencies and the role admissions of guilt play in our blaming practices. This paper focuses on the nature of guilty confession and argues that it illuminates an important function of blame that has been overlooked in the (...) recent work on guilt as it relates to blameworthiness: Blame can communicate respect. (shrink)

There are better and worse ways to blame others. Likewise, there are better and worse ways to blame yourself. And though there is an ever-expanding literature on the norms that govern our blaming practices, relatively little attention has been paid to the norms that govern expressions of self-blame. In this essay, I argue that when we blame ourselves, we ought not do so privately. Rather, we should, ceteris paribus, express our self-blame to those we have wronged. I then explore how (...) this norm can contribute to our understanding of the ethics of self-blame as well as the nature of blameworthiness itself. (shrink)

Philosophers ask just whose expression, if anyone’s, we hear in lyric poetry. Walton provides a novel possibility: it’s the reader who “uses” the poem (just as a speech giver uses a speech) who makes the language expressive. But worries arise once we consider poems in particular social or political settings, those which require a strong self-other distinction, or those with expressions that should not be disassociated from the subjects whose experience they draw from. One way to meet this challenge is (...) to consider the poem expressive of a plural subject, which frees us from looking for a particular individual whose voice we hear in the work, whether she be fictional or actual. Some lyrics give voice to a group whose experience is attended to in the work. This may be done through a posited fictional speaker, but the ontology of the speaker is shown to be less important. Attending to a group whose concerns are voiced allows us to explain how poems can manage to address our-worldly concerns even when lacking actual persons whose expressions we encounter in the poems. (shrink)